A Case for Controlling the Availability of Multi-Drone GCS

The transition from one operator–one drone to one operator–multiple drones is more than an efficiency gain. It represents a step-change in operational capability with clear implications for security.

These systems are being developed with legitimate intent. They are designed to enable security forces and emergency services to:

• Survey sites more rapidly

• Scale coverage without increasing manpower

• Provide real-time, persistent situational awareness

In this context, the benefits are clear.

However, the same capability introduces a critical risk.

The Threat

Emerging platforms now allow a single operator to supervise multiple semi-autonomous drones in real time. Unlike pre-programmed drone displays, these systems enable adaptive, coordinated behaviour across multiple assets.

In the wrong hands, this becomes a low-cost, commercially accessible swarm capability.

• A single operator can deploy multiple drones simultaneously

• Coordination requires limited technical expertise

• The system acts as a force multiplier, increasing scale and impact

Used maliciously, this begins to resemble a distributed weapons system:

• Multiple drones can overwhelm defences

• Redundancy increases the likelihood of mission success

• Attribution and response become more complex

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Why COTS Matters

While open-source solutions exist, they do not match the sensor capability, autonomy, and integration of commercial platforms such as DJI and Skydio.

This means advanced multi-drone capability is becoming:

Accessible, reliable, and operationally ready

rather than experimental or niche.

The Defensive Gap

Counter-UAS systems are still maturing and are largely optimised for:

• Single drones

• Small numbers of uncoordinated threats

They are not consistently proven against coordinated, semi-autonomous multi-drone attacks.

As a result, offensive capability is scaling faster than defensive systems.

A Case for Control

Military swarm capabilities are already treated as sensitive. However, in the civilian domain, multi-drone command software does not appear to be meaningfully controlled as a distinct capability.

Regulation today focuses primarily on:

• Airspace access (e.g. BVLOS)

• Operator certification

• Platform identification (e.g. Remote ID)

But the ability for a single user to command multiple semi-autonomous drones is not clearly addressed as a controlled function in its own right.

Given its dual-use nature, there is a strong argument for:

• Controlling access to advanced multi-drone control software

• Linking usage to licensing and oversight

• Restricting integration with high-capability platforms

  
  

Conclusion

These systems are being built to improve security, safety, and response capability.

However, they also enable a scalable, distributed attack capability using commercially available technology.

That dual-use reality cannot be ignored.

At minimum, this capability warrants urgent discussion within defence and security communities as a potential controlled technology, before its misuse becomes routine rather than exceptional.